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Abstract
Self-relevance exerts a powerful influence on information processing. Compared to material associated with other people, 
personally meaningful stimuli are prioritized during decision-making. Further exploring the character of this effect, here we 
considered the extent to which stimulus enhancement is impacted by the frequency of self-relevant versus friend-relevant 
material. In a matching task, participants reported whether shape-label stimulus pairs corresponded to previously learned 
associations (e.g., triangle = self, square = friend). Crucially however, before the task commenced, stimulus-based expectan-
cies were provided indicating the probability with which both self- and friend-related shapes would be encountered. The 
results revealed that task performance was impacted by the frequency of stimulus presentation in combination with the 
personal relevance of the items. When self- and friend-related shapes appeared with equal frequencies, a self-prioritization 
effect emerged (Expt. 1). Additionally, in both confirmatory (Expt. 2) and dis-confirmatory (Expt. 3) task contexts, stimuli 
that were encountered frequently (vs. infrequently) were prioritized, an effect that was most pronounced for self-relevant 
(vs. friend-relevant) items. Further computational analyses indicated that, in each of the reported experiments, differences 
in performance were underpinned by variation in the rate of information uptake, with evidence extracted more rapidly from 
self-relevant compared to friend-relevant stimuli. These findings advance our understanding of the emergence and origin of 
stimulus-prioritization effects during decisional processing.
Introduction
Reflecting the fundamental role that self-relevance exerts 
during information processing, recent years have witnessed 
a burgeoning interest in the degree to which the personal sig-
nificance of otherwise arbitrary material, most notably geo-
metric shapes, influences decision-making (Humphreys & 
Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017). Extending earlier 
research highlighting the memorial advantages of stimulus 
relevance (Symons & Johnson, 1997), self-prioritization—
whereby decision-making is facilitated for self-relevant (vs. 
other-relevant) information—has been documented across a 
wide range of task contexts (e.g., Frings & Wentura, 2014; 
Macrae et al., 2018; Mattan et al., 2015; Moradi et al., 2015; 
Payne et al., 2017; Schäfer et al., 2015, 2016; Sui et al., 
2012; Woźniak & Knoblich, 2019). Driving these effects, 
it has been claimed, is a mind that is exquisitely receptive 
to self-relevant inputs, such that they are enhanced during 
decisional processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Hum-
phreys, 2015, 2017).1 Extending work on this core social-
cognitive topic, here we considered the extent to which the 
frequency of stimulus presentation influences the processing 
of material pertaining to the self and others (Falbén et al., 
2020; Sui et al., 2014).
The self and stimulus prioritization
In a complex social world, it makes functional sense for 
minds to be responsive to material paired with targets other 
than the self. Although self-relevant stimuli unquestionably 
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1 It should be noted, however, that a range of non-self-relevant fac-
tors, including grammatical distinctiveness, item concreteness, and 
reward, also elicit stimulus-prioritization effects (e.g., Schäfer et  al., 
2017; Sui et al., 2012; Wade & Vickery, 2017).
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loom large in many settings (Constable et al., 2011, 2014), 
there are also countless occasions in which it would be 
foolhardy to prioritize these items (e.g., focusing on one’s 
already topped up wine glass when the boss requests a bever-
age). Put simply, were currently goal-irrelevant stimuli pri-
oritized by dint of their personal significance, information 
processing (and response selection) would rapidly grind to 
a halt. To service a flexible behavioral repertoire, stimulus 
prioritization must be sensitive to a range of influences, of 
which self-relevance is but one (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 
2017; Schäfer et al., 2017; Wade & Vickery, 2017). Thus, 
in principle, there should be a range of factors that trigger 
stimulus prioritization during decisional processing.
Developing this line of reasoning, Falbén et al., (2020) 
proposed that stimulus prioritization is likely influenced 
by information that has been overlooked in typical inves-
tigations of self-bias (Golubickis et al., 2018; Sui et al., 
2012), but is routinely present and utilized in life outside 
the laboratory; prior knowledge regarding the probability 
of encountering person-related stimuli in various settings. 
Before reconnoitring a partner’s walk-in closet, for example, 
one would anticipate encountering a multitude of their gar-
ments and perhaps only a few items of one’s own (and vice 
versa for one’s own closet). When available and applicable, 
expectations wield a powerful influence on perception and 
judgment (Bar, 2007; Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Pennycook 
& Thompson, 2012). Specifically, processing is facilitated 
for expected compared to unexpected material, with prior 
expectations about the prevalence of stimuli impacting the 
operations that support decision-making (De Loof et al., 
2016; Domenech & Dreher, 2010; Dunovan et al., 2014).
To explore the effects of prior beliefs on self-prioritiza-
tion, Falbén and colleagues adopted an object-ownership 
paradigm (Golubickis et al., 2018). As psychological exten-
sions of the self, one’s possessions are advantaged during 
stimulus appraisal (Morewedge & Giblin, 2015; Pierce 
et al., 2003). Compared to other people’s belongings, per-
sonal possession confers a processing benefit during object 
detection, classification, and recollection—the so-called 
self-ownership effect (Constable et al.Cunningham et al., 
2008; Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Exploiting this robust 
phenomenon, Falbén et al. (2020) demonstrated that stimu-
lus prioritization was moderated by the frequency with 
which self- and friend-related items were encountered dur-
ing an object-ownership task. When no information about 
the prevalence of stimulus presentation was available, rep-
licating previous research, self-owned objects were classi-
fied more rapidly than items owned by a friend (Golubickis 
et al., 2018), a self-prioritization effect that was abolished 
when participants were informed that self- and friend-owned 
objects were equally likely to be encountered during the 
task. Furthermore, in both confirmatory and dis-confirm-
atory task contexts—regardless of ownership—frequently 
(vs. infrequently) presented items elicited stimulus prior-
itization. Adopting a drift diffusion model (DDM) analysis 
to elucidate the origin of this effect (Ratcliff et al., 2016; 
Voss et al., 2013), stimulus prioritization was traced to the 
operation of a response bias (Falbén et al., 2020). Specifi-
cally, less evidence was required when judging frequently 
compared to infrequently presented stimuli (De Loof et al., 
2016; Dunovan et al., 2014).
Stimulus frequency and decision‑making
Falbén et al.’s (2020) findings were noteworthy for a number 
of reasons. At least in the context of an object-ownership 
task, they demonstrated the flexibility of stimulus prioritiza-
tion and traced decisional bias to differences in the eviden-
tial requirements of response generation (Golubickis et al., 
2018, 2020; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Schäfer et al., 
2017; Wade & Vickery, 2017). Notwithstanding these obser-
vations however, critical issues remain. Three in particular 
merit consideration. First, although ownership has proved a 
productive arena for exploring the effects of self-relevance 
on decision-making (Constable et al., Falbén et al., 2019; 
Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019; Truong et al., 2017), stimulus 
prioritization has been most strongly linked with matching 
tasks in which participants judge the accuracy of previously 
formed shape-label pairings (Sui et al., 2012, 2014). Thus, it 
is unclear if the effects observed when participants respond 
to expected or unexpected objects associated (i.e., owned by) 
with the self and a friend also extend to tasks in which geo-
metric shapes serve as proxies for these targets (Humphreys 
& Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015).
Second, Falbén et al.’s (2020) demonstration of the elimi-
nation of self-bias is surprising given the reported ubiquity 
of this effect (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Schäfer et al., 
2017; Sui & Humphreys, 2017; Sui et al., 2014; Wade & 
Vickery, 2017). For example, prior to the performance of a 
matching task, Reuther and Chakravarthi (2017) introduced 
a training phase in which error-free learning was equated 
for all the shape-label stimulus pairs. Despite this extensive 
pre-task preparation, self-prioritization persisted. Given life-
long experience dealing with personally relevant material, 
this bias probably derives from the enhanced accessibility 
of self-shape (vs. friend-shape) relations in working mem-
ory against which stimuli must be compared to perform the 
matching task (Caughey et al., 2021; Constable et al., 2019a, 
2019b; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Wade & Vickery, 
2017). In addition, a central premise of Sui and Humphrey’s 
Self-Attention Network (SAN) model is that self-relevance 
facilitates the processing of personally meaningful inputs 
through the interplay of top–down (i.e., self-activation) 
and bottom–up (i.e., allocation of attention) processes in 
an obligatory manner (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & 
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Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui et al., 2013). Collectively, these 
observations suggest that the abolishment of self-bias would 
not be anticipated.
Third, it is possible that Falbén et al.’s (2020) behavioral 
and modeling findings derived from specific characteristics 
of the ownership task that was adopted. Based on previous 
research (De Loof et al., 2016; Dunovan et al., 2014), a key 
element of Falbén et al.’s paradigm was that self-owned and 
friend-owned items were presented with different frequen-
cies (e.g., self-frequent vs. friend-frequent). What of course 
this means in the context of an object-classification task is 
that one of the response keys (i.e., self-owned or friend-
owned) was used more often than the other. Accordingly, it 
is possible that potent response-related expectancies masked 
the contribution that stimulus-based processes (i.e., rate of 
evidence gathering) play during decision-making (Golu-
bickis et al., 2017, 2020; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015, 2017; White & Poldrack, 2014).
Contrasting Falbén et al.’s (2020) methodology, a use-
ful feature of matching tasks is that participants respond to 
shape-label pairings that correspond to previously learned 
associations (e.g., triangle = you, square = friend) on half the 
experimental trials, but mismatch these associations (e.g., 
square = you, triangle = friend) on the remaining trials (Sui 
et al., 2012). As the response options (i.e., matching vs. non-
matching) are used equally often during the task and do not 
explicitly reference self or other, this therefore raises the 
possibility of manipulating stimulus frequencies without 
creating a bias for either self- or friend-related responses. 
In this way, shape-label matching tasks afford the ability 
to explore stimulus prioritization in a task context absent 
response-related expectancies, thus are better able to probe 
the role that stimulus-based processes may play during deci-
sion-making (Sui et al., 2012).
To date, only a single investigation by Sui et al. (2014) 
has considered how the frequency of presentation of items 
pertaining to the self and others (i.e., mother & stranger) 
influences self-prioritization in a shape-label matching task. 
Motivating this research was the observation that processing 
is routinely impacted by the probability with which different 
classes of stimuli appear, such that performance is enhanced 
for frequently (vs. infrequently) presented items (e.g., Logan 
et al., 1984; Milligan & Lupiáñez, 2005; Schmidt, 2013; 
Schmidt & Besner, 2008). Interestingly, however, across a 
series of studies, Sui et al. (2014) demonstrated that self-
prioritization was indifferent to the frequency of stimulus 
presentation, with self-bias emerging even when self-rel-
evant (vs. other-relevant) items were presented on only a 
minority of trials (i.e., self-prioritization superseded the 
effects of stimulus frequency). In addition, although stimuli 
relating to mother yielded a prioritization effect when these 
items predominated during the task, this processing benefit 
only emerged when stranger was the target of comparison 
(i.e., mother < stranger). When contrasted with responses 
to self-relevant items, performance was equivalent (i.e., 
mother = self). Albeit in a different task context, these 
findings conflict with Falbén et al.’s (2020) demonstration 
that, regardless of the target of association, frequently (vs. 
infrequently) encountered stimuli were prioritized during 
decision-making.
The current research
Noting these inconsistencies in the extant literature (Falbén 
et al., 2020; Sui et al., 2014), here we considered the extent 
to which the likelihood of encountering self- and friend-
related items (i.e., geometric shapes) during a shape-label 
matching task influences stimulus prioritization. Following 
Sui et al. (2012), participants initially formed shape-label 
associations, after which they judged whether stimulus pairs 
matched or mismatched the previously forged relations. Cru-
cially, however, before the matching task began, expectan-
cies about the prevalence with which self- and friend-related 
shapes would be encountered were provided (Falbén et al., 
2020), beliefs that ultimately were confirmed (i.e., Expt. 1 
& 2) or disconfirmed (i.e., Expt. 3) by the actual frequency 
of stimulus presentation.
The goal of our first experiment was to establish the 
influence that self-relevance per se exerts during shape-
label matching. As such, participants were told to expect 
an equivalent number of self- and friend-related items to be 
presented. Unlike Falbén et al., (2020), absent the operation 
of self-other response-related expectancies—and reflecting 
the strength of self-shape associations in working memory—
a self-prioritization effect was expected to emerge on match-
ing trials under these conditions (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 
2017; Sui et al., 2012; Wade & Vickery, 2017).2 To identify 
the processes underlying task performance (i.e., stimulus 
and/or response biases), a drift diffusion model (DDM) anal-
ysis was conducted on the data as this approach has been 
applied successfully in previous work exploring the origins 
of stimulus prioritization (Falbén et al., 2020; Golubickis 
et al., 2017, 2018, 2020). Replicating previous research that 
has used shape-label matching tasks to probe self-bias (Gol-
ubickis et al., 2017, 2020), we expected self-prioritization 
to be underpinned by differences in the rate of information 
uptake during decisional processing. Specifically, informa-
tion would be extracted more rapidly from self-related com-
pared to friend-related items.
2 Whereas self-prioritization reliably emerges on shape-label match-
ing trials, prior research has yielded mixed evidence for self-related 
processing gains during nonmatching trials (Frings & Wentura, 2014; 
Moradi et  al., 2015; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Schäfer et  al., 
2015, 2016; Sui et al., 2012).
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Experiment 1: equivalent context
Method
Participants and design
Twenty undergraduates (14 female, Mage = 19.32, 
SD = 5.08) took part in the experiment. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to 
the commencement of the experiment and the protocol 
was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at 
the School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen. The 
experiment had a 2 (Shape Association: self or friend) X 2 
(Matching Condition: matching or nonmatching) repeated-
measures design. The smallest effect size that could be 
detected for a within-participants two-way interaction with 
a sample of 20 participants, 50 observations per experi-
mental condition, and 80% power, was estimated to be 
d = 0.38 (PANGEA v0.2).
Stimulus materials and procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were 
greeted by an experimenter, seated at a desktop com-
puter, and informed that the study comprised a match-
ing task featuring geometric shapes that represented 
them (i.e., self) and their best friend (Sui et al., 2012). 
The experimenter then explained that participants would 
be presented with a shape and a label on the computer 
screen and their task was to indicate, via a button press 
as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the shape-
label pair matched or non-matched the previously formed 
associations. Responses were given using two keys on the 
keyboard (i.e., N and M). Key-response mappings were 
counterbalanced across participants and the labels ‘match’ 
and ‘non-match’ located above the relevant response key. 
Participants were informed that during the task, an equal 
number of self-related and friend-related shapes (i.e., 50% 
self & 50% friend) would be presented. Next, participants 
were told that the computer would randomly assign one 
geometric shape to denote them and another shape to 
denote their friend. They then pressed spacebar on the key-
board and were shown a screen indicating which geomet-
ric shapes designated self and friend, respectively (e.g., 
you = square, friend = triangle). The assignment of shapes 
to self and friend was counterbalanced across the sample 
and the shapes were not presented during this phase of the 
task (Sui et al., 2012).
Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixa-
tion cross for 1000 ms, followed by the pairing of a shape 
above, and a label below, the fixation cross, respectively, 
for 100 ms. After each shape-label pairing was presented, 
the screen turned blank until participants reported the 
accuracy of the association. The stimuli comprised two 
white images of geometric shapes (i.e., triangle & square) 
on a grey background. Images were 138 × 138 pixels in 
size. The labels designating the participant and their friend 
were ‘You’ or ‘Friend’ and appeared below the shapes.
Participants initially performed ten practice trials, fol-
lowed by a block of 200 experimental trials. Half of the 
trials displayed a matching association and half a nonmatch-
ing shape-label pairing (i.e., the shape did not correspond 
with the label; see Sui, et al., 2012, 2013, 2014). Thus, there 
were 50 trials in each condition (i.e., self-matching, self-
nonmatching, friend-matching, and friend-nonmatching). 
A self-matching trial displayed an image of a square (or 
triangle, depending on the counterbalancing) above the fixa-
tion cross, together with the label ‘You’ underneath the fixa-
tion cross. The order in which the trials were presented was 
randomized. On completion of the task, participants were 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Response time
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analy-
sis (Sui et al., 2012), eliminating less than 1% of the overall 
trials. A multilevel model analysis was used to examine the 
correct response time (RT) and accuracy data (see Table S1 
in the Supplementary Material for a listing of all the treat-
ment means). Analyses were conducted using the R pack-
age ‘lmer4’ (Pinheiro et al., 2015). Shape Association and 
Matching Condition were treated as categorical fixed effects, 
and participants as a crossed random effect (Judd et al., 
2012). The analysis of the RTs yielded main effects of Shape 
Association (b =  − 10.88, SE = 3.43, t =  − 3.19, p = 0.001, 
R2 = 0.10), Matching Condition (b =  − 24.02, SE = 3.41, 
t =  − 10.37, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.12), and a significant Shape 
Association X Matching Condition (b =  − 22.45, SE = 3.41, 
t =  − 6.58, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.13) interaction. Further analy-
sis of the interaction (Fig. 1) revealed that, during match-
ing trials, responses were faster to self-related compared to 
friend-related stimuli (b =  − 33.51, SE = 4.75, t =  − 7.06, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.13). In contrast, during nonmatching trials, 
responses were faster to friend-related than to self-related 
items (b = 11.22, SE = 4.91, t = 2.29, p = 0.02, R2 = 0.11).
Accuracy
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy 
of responses revealed a main effect of Shape Association 
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(b = 0.21, SE = 0.04, z = 5.04, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.08) and a sig-
nificant Shape Association X Matching Condition (b = 0.17, 
SE = 0.041, z = 4.16, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.09) interaction. Fur-
ther analysis of the interaction (Fig. 2) revealed that, during 
matching trials, accuracy was higher for self-related com-
pared to friend-related stimuli (b = 0.38, SE = 0.06, z = 6.31, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.09). During nonmatching trials, no signifi-
cant difference in accuracy was observed.
Drift diffusion modeling
A DDM analysis was used to explore the processes under-
pinning task performance. Previous computational investiga-
tions of self-prioritization have shown that, during a shape-
label matching task, there are several decisional processes 
that drive self-bias. Specifically, self-relevance modulates 
the rate of information uptake and elicits a response bias 
toward matching (vs. nonmatching) judgments (Golubickis 
et al., 2017, 2020). Given these findings, the current mod-
eling analysis examined the extent to which stimulus- and 
response-related processes underpin shape-label matching 
(White & Poldrack, 2014).
The DDM uses both response latency and accuracy to 
estimate the latent cognitive processes associated with task 
performance and how they unfold over time (Ratcliff et al., 
2016). During binary decision-making (e.g., is a shape-label 
pairing matching or nonmatching), evidence is continuously 
gathered from a stimulus until one or other response thresh-
old has been reached. The benefit of sequential sampling 
models, such as the DDM, lies in the ability to identify the 
stimulus and/or response biases that underpin task perfor-
mance (Ratcliff et al., 2016; Voss et al., 2013; White & 
Poldrack, 2014). In this respect, the DDM comprises four 
parameters that describe decisional processing. First, drift 
rate (v) estimates the quality and speed of evidence sam-
pling (i.e., larger v = faster information uptake). This com-
ponent represents noisy information accumulation during 
decision-making, and thus is treated as a measure of percep-
tual efficiency. The second parameter is boundary separation 
(a). It quantifies the space (i.e., distance) between the two 
response thresholds, and thus refers to the amount of infor-
mation required before a judgment is made. Large values 
of a represent a conservative and cautious decision-making 
style, whereas small values signal a more liberal, less careful 
approach. Next, between the two response boundaries, the 
starting point (z) specifies the position at which the noisy 
information sampling process begins. In situations in which 
z is not centred between the boundaries, the starting point 
represents a response bias in favor of the nearer boundary 
(i.e., variation in the evidential requirements of response 
selection). Finally, all processes that do not contribute to 
decision-making (e.g., stimulus encoding, response execu-
tion) are described by the non-decision time parameter (t0).
To elucidate the origins of self-prioritization, a hierarchi-
cal drift diffusion model (HDDM) analysis was conducted 
on the data (Vandekerckhove et al., 2011). HDDM is an 
open-source Python toolbox for the hierarchical Bayesian 
computation of DDM decisional components (Wiecki et al., 
2013). The HDDM treats model parameters for individual 
participants as random samples constrained by group-level 
distributions (Vandekerckhove et  al., 2011). Following 
previous research (Golubickis et al., 2017, 2020), the mod-
els were response coded (i.e., upper threshold = matching 
response, lower threshold = nonmatching response). Four 
models were estimated for comparison (see Table 1). The 
first two models allowed the drift rate (v) and starting point 
(z) to vary as a function of Matching Condition (i.e., match-
ing vs. nonmatching). These comprise the two simplest mod-
els available in a shape-label matching task and consider 
whether performance is underpinned by differences in the 
Fig. 1  Mean response time as a function of Shape Association and 
Matching Condition (Expt. 1—Equivalent Context). Error bars rep-
resent + 1 SEM
Fig. 2  Mean accuracy as a function of Shape Association and Match-




rate of information uptake between matching and nonmatch-
ing trials and/or response-related processes indicative of a 
confirmatory matching-bias (Golubickis et al., 2017, 2020). 
Critically, models 1 and 2 assumed no difference in the 
rate of information uptake as a function of Shape Associa-
tion. The third model allowed the drift rate (v) to vary as 
a function of Shape Association (i.e., self vs. friend) and 
Matching Condition, while the starting point (z) was not 
estimated (z = 0.50, no bias). This parameterization exam-
ined whether decision-making was underpinned solely by 
differences in the efficiency of stimulus processing. Finally, 
model 4 allowed the drift rate (v) to vary as a function of 
Shape Association and Matching Condition and the start-
ing point (z) to vary between the response thresholds. This 
parameterization considered whether task performance was 
facilitated by increased information uptake, with response-
related processes contributing toward a matching-bias. 
Previously, this parameter setup has been found to be best 
fitting in shape-label matching tasks (i.e., default model; 
Golubickis et al., 2017, 2020). All four models estimated 
the inter-trial variability for drift rate (sv), non-decision time 
(st), and starting point (sz).
For each model, 10,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) samples (1,000 burn-in) were simulated. Due 
to its computational efficiency and widespread use when 
using hierarchical models, the Deviance Information Cri-
terion (DIC) was adopted as a measure of fit for the model 
comparisons (Spiegelhalter et al., 1998). Lower DIC val-
ues indicate greater fit as they favor models with the least 
number of parameters and highest likelihood. As can be 
seen in Table 1, in line with previous research, model 4 was 
the best fit (Golubickis et al., 2017, 2020). Analysis of the 
posterior distributions revealed that task performance was 
underpinned by differences in information uptake (drift rate, 
v) and the evidential requirements of response generation 
(starting point, z, Table 2). During matching trials, there was 
extremely strong evidence that information uptake (i.e., drift 
rate) was faster for self-relevant compared to friend-relevant 
stimuli (negative drift rates were first multiplied by − 1) 
(pBayes[self > friend] < 0.001).3 No evidence for a difference 
in drift rates was observed during nonmatching trials (pBayes
[self > friend] = 0.409). In addition, comparing the starting 
point value (z) with no bias (z = 0.50) yielded extremely 
strong evidence of a response bias in favor of matching (vs. 
nonmatching) judgments (pBayes[bias > 0.50] < 0.001).
Discussion
Supporting our hypothesis, under conditions in which 
equivalent frequencies of self- and friend-related shapes 
were presented, a self-prioritization effect emerged. Spe-
cifically, responses on shape-label matching trials were 
faster and more accurate to self-related compared to friend-
related items (cf. Falbén et al., 2020). In addition, an HDDM 
analysis revealed that self-prioritization was underpinned 
by a stimulus bias. Notably, information uptake (i.e., drift 
rate) was faster for self-relevant than friend-relevant stimuli 
(Golubickis et al., 2017, 2020). Although failing to repli-
cate Falbén et al.’s (2020) elimination of self-prioritization 
when self- and friend-related items were expected to appear 
equally often in an object-ownership task, the current results 
resonate with prior work that has explored self-bias using 
shape-label matching tasks (Sui et al., 2012, 2014). As 
attention must explicitly be directed to the self-relevance 
(or otherwise) of shape-label relations to perform the match-
ing task successfully (Caughey et al., 2021), the strongest 
associative linkages in working memory exert the greatest 
influence on task performance (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 
2017). Accordingly, when stimulus frequencies (i.e., self & 
Table 1  Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Expt. 
1)
v = drift rate, z = starting point
Model Shape association Matching condition DIC
1 – v 3037
2 – z, v 3010
3 v v 2985
4 v z, v 2953
Table 2  Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) 
quantiles of the best fitting model (Expt. 1)
a threshold separation, v drift rate, z starting point, t0 non-decision 
time, sv inter-trial variability in drift rate, st inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time, sz inter-trial variability in starting point
Diffusion model parameter Mean Quantile
2.5q 97.5q
a 0.957 0.88 1.044
vmatching-self 1.744 1.294 2.222
vmatching-friend 0.79 0.572 1.037
vnonmatching-self  − 1.372  − 1.897  − 0.854
vnonmatching-friend  − 1.399  − 1.915  − 0.846
z 0.544 0.524 0.567
t0 0.437 0.41 0.465
st 0.446 0.418 0.475
sv 0.151 0.005 0.413
sz 0.304 0.085 0.450
3 Note that in contrast to conventional p values, the Bayesian p com-
putes the level at which posterior distributions are consistent with the 
hypothesis of interest (e.g., self > friend). For instance, a Bayesian p 
of .10 is indicative of 90% support for the hypothesis.
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other) are equivalent—and potent response-related expectan-
cies are absent (cf. Falbén et al., 2020)—a self-prioritization 
effect emerges.
Extending the scope of the current investigation, in our 
next experiment, we varied the frequency with which self- 
and friend-related shapes were encountered during the 
shape-label matching task (Falbén et al., 2020; Sui et al., 
2014). Specifically, prior to the commencement of the 
task, participants were told to expect a higher frequency of 
either self-shapes or friend-shapes to be presented (i.e., 75% 
vs. 25%), expectancies that were confirmed by the actual 
prevalence of stimulus presentation. Based on the results of 
Experiment 1 (i.e., default bias toward self-relevant stimuli), 
we expected that frequently (vs. infrequently) encountered 
stimuli would be prioritized during decisional processing 
(cf. Sui et al., 2014), but this effect would be larger for self-
relevant compared to friend-relevant items (cf. Falbén et al., 
2020). As previously, an HDDM analysis was conducted 
to identify the processes driving task performance, with a 
stimulus bias hypothesized to underpin item prioritization.
Experiment 2: confirmatory context
Method
Participants and design
Twenty-four undergraduates (16 female, Mage = 19.72, 
SD = 2.33) took part in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed con-
sent was obtained from participants prior to the commence-
ment of the experiment and the protocol was reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of Psy-
chology, University of Aberdeen. The experiment had a 2 
(Stimulus Frequency: self-frequent or friend-frequent) X 2 
(Shape Association: self or friend) X 2 (Matching Condi-
tion: matching or nonmatching) repeated-measures design. 
The smallest effect size that could be detected for a within-
participants three-way interaction (for Experiments 2 & 
3) with a sample of 24 participants, 50 observations per 
experimental condition, and 80% power, was estimated to 
be d = 0.24 (PANGEA v0.2).
Stimulus materials and procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were 
greeted by an experimenter, seated at a desktop computer, 
and informed that the study comprised a matching task fea-
turing geometric shapes that represented them (i.e., self) 
and their best friend (Sui et al., 2012). The task closely 
followed Experiment 1, but with an important modifica-
tion. Participants were told that they would complete two 
blocks of trials: one with a higher frequency of self-related 
shapes (i.e., 75% self & 25% friend), and one with a higher 
frequency of friend-related shapes (i.e., 75% friend & 25% 
self). Block order was counterbalanced across the sample 
and participants were reminded whether the self-shape or 
friend-shape would predominate prior to the respective 
block. Participants initially performed ten practice trials, 
after which the main task commenced. Each block com-
prised 200 trials. The self-frequent block consisted of 100 
matching and 100 nonmatching trials. Of these, 150 com-
prised self-related shape-label pairings, with 75 matching 
and 75 nonmatching trials. The remaining 50 trials com-
prised friend-related shape-label pairings, with 25 matching 
and 25 nonmatching trials. The friend-frequent block had an 
identical trial structure, but with friend-related shape-label 
pairings presented most frequently. The order of the trials 
was randomized in each block. On completion of the task, 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Response time
Responses faster than 200  ms were excluded from the 
analysis (Sui et al., 2012), eliminating less than 2% of the 
overall trials. A multilevel model analysis was used to 
examine the correct RT and accuracy data (see Table S2 
in the Supplementary Material for a listing of all the treat-
ment means). Stimulus Frequency, Shape Association, 
and Matching Condition were treated as categorical fixed 
effects, and participants as a crossed random effect. The 
analysis of RTs yielded main effects of Stimulus Frequency 
(b = 9.13, SE = 2.48, t = 3.67, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.19), Shape 
Association (b =  − 9.64, SE = 2.48, t =  − 3.88, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.19), and Matching Condition (b =  − 25.76, SE = 2.49, 
t =  − 10.37, p < 0.001, R2 = 0. 21), and significant Stimulus 
Frequency X Shape Association (b =  − 35.12, SE = 2.49, 
t =  − 14.13, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.22) and Shape Association 
X Matching Condition (b =  − 5.71, SE = 2.49, t =  − 2.30, 
p = 0.02, R2 = 0.21) interactions. The Stimulus Frequency 
X Shape Association X Matching Condition interaction 
was not significant. Further analysis of the critical Stimu-
lus Frequency X Shape Association interaction, collapsed 
across Matching Condition (Fig. 3), revealed that when 
self-related stimuli were presented most frequently during 
the task, responses were faster to self- compared to friend-
related items (b =  − 46.05, SE = 3.55, t = 12.97, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.28). In contrast, when friend-related stimuli were 
presented most frequently, responses were faster to friend- 
than to self-related items (b = 24.45, SE = 3.46, t = 7.06, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.21). As indicated by the respective effect 
sizes, although stimulus prioritization was observed for 
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frequently (vs. infrequently) encountered items, this effect 
was more pronounced for self-related compared to friend-
related stimuli.
Accuracy
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy 
of responses revealed a main effect of Shape Association 
(b = 0.25, SE = 0.03, z = 8.34, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.14) and sig-
nificant Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association (b = 0.50, 
SE = 0.03, z = 16.30, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.18) and Shape Asso-
ciation X Matching Condition (b = 0.14, SE = 0.03, z = 4.53, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.14) interactions. The Stimulus Frequency 
X Shape Association X Matching Condition interaction 
was not significant. Further analysis of the Stimulus Fre-
quency X Shape Association interaction collapsed across 
Matching Condition (Fig. 4) revealed that, when self-related 
stimuli were presented most frequently during the task, 
accuracy was higher for self- compared to friend-related 
items (b = 0.76, SE = 0.04, z = 17.22, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.23). 
In contrast, when friend-related stimuli were presented 
most frequently, accuracy was higher for friend- than self-
related items (b =  − 0.25, SE = 0.04, z =  − 5.67, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.14). For the response latencies, prioritization was 
greater for self-relevant compared to friend-relevant stimuli.
Drift diffusion modeling
To explore the processes underpinning task performance, 
an HDDM analysis was conducted on the data (Wiecki 
et al., 2013). Three models were estimated for comparison 
(Table 3). Model 1 (i.e., default model) allowed the drift rate 
(v) to vary as a function of Stimulus Frequency (i.e., self-
frequent vs. friend-frequent), Shape Association (i.e., self 
vs. friend) and Matching Condition (matching vs. nonmatch-
ing) and the starting point (z) to vary between the response 
thresholds (i.e., Matching Condition). This model consid-
ered whether decision-making was facilitated exclusively 
by increased information uptake (i.e., stimulus bias), while 
response-related processes contributed toward a confirma-
tory matching-bias. The second model was identical to the 
first, but with the starting point (z) varying as a function of 
Stimulus Frequency to establish if prior beliefs influenced 
response-related processes (i.e., less decisional evidence 
was needed for self-related than friend-related matching 
responses). Finally, in addition to the default (i.e., model 1) 
parameterization, the third model allowed boundary separa-
tion (a) to vary as a function of Stimulus Frequency to test 
whether self- (vs. friend-based) stimulus frequencies altered 
participants’ decisional style (i.e., conservative vs. liberal). 
All three models estimated the inter-trial variability for drift 
rate (sv), non-decision time (st), and starting point (sz).
As can be seen in Table 3, model 3 was the best fit. 
Analysis of the posterior distributions indicated that task 
performance was underpinned by differences in processing 
efficiency (drift rate, v), decision-making style (boundary 
separation, a), and the evidential requirements of response 
generation (starting point, z, Table 4). When the self-
shape was presented most frequently, there was extremely 
Fig. 3  Mean response time as a function of Stimulus Frequency and 
Shape Association (Expt. 2—Confirmatory Context). Error bars rep-
resent + 1 SEM
Fig. 4  Mean accuracy as a function of Stimulus Frequency and Shape 
Association (Expt. 2—Confirmatory Context). Error bars repre-
sent + 1 SEM
Table 3  Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Expt. 
2)








1 v v z, v 4160
2 v, z v z, v 4156
3 v, a v z, v 4154
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strong evidence that information uptake (i.e., drift rate) 
was faster for self-relevant compared to friend-relevant 
stimuli on both matching (pBayes[self > friend] < 0.001) 
and nonmatching (pBayes[self > friend] < 0.001) trials. The 
opposite effect was observed when the friend-shape was 
presented most frequently, such that information uptake 
was faster for friend-related (vs. self-related) items (nega-
tive drift rates were first multiplied by − 1) during both 
matching (pBayes[friend > self] = 0.001) and nonmatching 
(pBayes[friend > self] < 0.001) trials. Further compari-
sons revealed that, during matching trials, information 
uptake was faster when the frequent stimuli pertained to 
self rather than to friend (pBayes[self-frequent > friend-
frequent] < 0.001). This effect was not significant dur-
ing nonmatching trials (pBayes[self-frequent > friend-fre-
quent] = 0.294). In other words, during matching trials, 
information uptake was fastest when the self-shape (vs. 
friend-shape) comprised the most frequently encountered 
stimulus (Table 4).
Additionally, analysis of the posterior distributions 
yielded extremely strong evidence that participants adopted 
a more conservative decisional strategy (i.e., larger a) when 
self-related (vs. friend-related) stimuli appeared more fre-
quently (pBayes[self-frequent > friend-frequent] = 0.002). 
Finally, comparing the starting point value (z) with no bias 
(z = 0.50) revealed extremely strong evidence of a response 
bias in favor of matching (vs. nonmatching) judgments 
(pBayes[bias > 0.50] < 0.001).
Discussion
Corroborating our prediction, the current results revealed 
that processing was facilitated for stimuli that appeared most 
frequently during the shape-label matching task, a prioriti-
zation effect that was more pronounced for self- compared 
to friend-related items (cf. Falbén et al., 2020). This effect, 
moreover, emerged on both matching and nonmatching tri-
als (cf. Frings & Wentura, 2014; Schäfer et al., 2015, 2016; 
Sui et al., 2012). As in Experiment 1, decisional bias was 
underpinned by differences in the rate of information uptake 
(Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019), but with evidence extracted 
more rapidly from self-relevant than friend-relevant stimuli. 
Two other effects were revealed by the HDDM analysis. 
First, participants were more cautious (i.e., wider threshold 
separation) when self-relevant rather than friend-relevant 
stimuli were expected to appear more frequently, suggest-
ing that accuracy was emphasized for the former material. 
Second, less evidence was needed to generate matching than 
nonmatching responses, a confirmatory bias that is consist-
ent with previous research exploring the effects of stimulus 
relevance during shape-label matching tasks (Golubickis 
et al., 2017, 2020).
A key feature of Experiments 1 and 2 was that prior 
beliefs were predictive with respect to the forthcoming 
experimental trials (De Loof et al., 2016; Dunovan et al., 
2014; Falbén et al., 2020). That is, having been told to expect 
an equivalent number of self-related and friend-related items 
or that the highest frequency of shapes would comprise 
either self-related or friend-related stimuli, this was indeed 
the case. A natural question to ask, therefore, is what would 
happen in a dis-confirmatory task context in which the sup-
posedly minority stimuli are encountered most frequently? 
In their object-ownership task, under just such conditions, 
Falbén et al., (2020; Expt. 3) demonstrated that inaccurate 
priors were overridden in accordance with the stimuli that 
predominated during the task. That is, frequent (vs. infre-
quent) stimuli were prioritized during decisional process-
ing. This indicates that participants optimized a probabilistic 
representation of the immediate task environment, triggering 
stimulus enhancement for the most prevalent items (Bar, 
2007; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; O’Callaghan et al., 2017; 
Otten et al., 2017). But would comparable effects emerge in 
a shape-label matching task? Given the results of Experi-
ment 2 (i.e., personal relevance augments the effects of 
stimulus frequency), we hypothesized that frequently (vs. 
infrequently) encountered stimuli would be prioritized in a 
dis-confirmatory task setting. However, this effect would be 
larger for self-related compared to friend-related items (cf. 
Falbén et al., 2020).
Of additional theoretical interest in dis-confirmatory 
task contexts are the temporal characteristics of stimulus 
Table 4  Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) 
quantiles of the best fitting model (Expt. 2)
a threshold separation, v drift rate, z starting point, t0 non-decision 
time, sv inter-trial variability in drift rate, st inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time, sz inter-trial variability in starting point
Diffusion model parameter Mean Quantile
2.5q 97.5q
aself-frequent 1.033 0.938 1.114
afriend-frequent 0.995 0.926 1.072
vself-frequent/matching-self 2.274 1.906 2.613
vself-frequent/matching-friend 0.325 0.062 0.703
vself-frequent/nonmatching-self −1.966 −2.327 −1.602
vself-frequent/nonmatching-friend −0.831 −1.215 −0.44
vfriend-frequent/matching-self 1.123 0.726 1.505
vfriend-frequent/matching-friend 1.484 1.314 1.637
vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-self −1.136 −1.535 −0.725
vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-friend −1.915 −2.287 −1.565
z 0.543 0.527 0.559
t0 0.412 0.383 0.445
st 0.365 0.354 0.377
sv 0.087 0.004 0.251
sz 0.406 0.341 0.475
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prioritization. If participants initially adopt an expec-
tancy based on the experimental instructions (i.e., prior 
belief), but later update this belief in accordance with the 
actual frequency with which stimuli are encountered (i.e., 
posterior belief), then performance may be influenced 
by the strength of the initial expectancy. That is, strong 
(vs. weak) expectancies may be less susceptible to modi-
fication. Given the demonstration in Experiment 2 that 
stimulus prioritization was greater for self- than friend-
related items, this suggests that self- and friend-related 
expectancies may differ in stability/persistence in the face 
of disconfirmation (Wang et al., 2016). Acknowledging 
this possibility, in our next experiment, we explored the 
dynamic effects of expectancy disconfirmation during the 
shape-label matching task.
Experiment 3: dis‑confirmatory context
Method
Participants and design
Twenty-five undergraduates (18 female, Mage = 20.4, 
SD = 2.75) took part in the experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed con-
sent was obtained from participants prior to the commence-
ment of the experiment and the protocol was reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of Psy-
chology, University of Aberdeen. The experiment had 2 
(Stimulus Frequency: self-frequent or friend-frequent) X 2 
(Shape Association: self or friend) X 2 (Matching Condi-
tion: matching or nonmatching) X Trial Number repeated-
measures design.
Stimulus materials and procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were 
greeted by an experimenter, seated at a desktop computer, 
and informed that the study comprised a matching task fea-
turing geometric shapes that represented them (i.e., self) 
and their best friend (Sui et al., 2012). The task closely fol-
lowed Experiment 2, but with a different manipulation of 
stimulus-related frequencies. Across two blocks of trials, 
following Falbén et al., (2020), although participants were 
told to expect a higher frequency of either the self-shape 
(i.e., 75% self & 25% friend) or the friend-shape (i.e., 75% 
friend & 25% self) to be presented during the task, in reality, 
the opposite was the case (i.e., self-frequent: 25% self-shape 
& 75% friend-shape; friend-frequent: 25% friend-shape & 
75% self-shape). The order of the experimental blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants and each block com-
prised 200 trials. The self-frequent (i.e., friend-expectancy) 
block consisted of 100 matching and 100 nonmatching tri-
als. Of these, 150 trials comprised self-related shape-label 
pairings, with 75 matching and 75 nonmatching trials. The 
remaining 50 trials comprised friend-related shape-label 
pairings, with 25 matching and 25 nonmatching trials. The 
friend-frequent (i.e., self-expectancy) block had an identical 
trial structure, but with friend-related shape-label pairings 
presented most frequently. The order of the trials was ran-
domized in each block. On completion of the task, partici-
pants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Response time
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analy-
sis (Sui et al., 2012), eliminating less than 2% of the overall 
trials. A multilevel model analysis was used to examine the 
correct RT and accuracy data (see Table S3 in the Supple-
mentary Material for a listing of all the treatment means). 
Stimulus Frequency, Shape Association, and Matching Con-
dition were treated as categorical fixed effects, Trial Number 
as a continuous variable, and participants as a crossed ran-
dom effect. This yielded main effects of Stimulus Frequency 
(b = 11.11, SE = 4.66, t = 2.38, p = 0.01, R2 = 0.18), Shape 
Association (b =  − 13.74, SE = 4.66, t =  − 2.95, p = 0.01, 
R2 = 0.19), and Matching Condition (b =  − 20.50, SE = 4.67, 
t =  − 4.39, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.20), and significant Stimu-
lus Frequency X Shape Association (b = 12.39, SE = 4.66, 
t = 2.66, p = 0.01, R2 = 0.20) and Stimulus Frequency X 
Shape Association X Trial Number (b = 0.12, SE = 0.04, 
t = 3.02, p = 0.002, R2 = 0.20) interactions. The Stimulus 
Frequency X Shape Association X Matching Condition 
interaction was not significant.
Further inspection of the critical Stimulus Frequency X 
Shape association interaction collapsed across Matching 
Condition (Fig. 5) revealed that, when self-related stimuli 
were presented most frequently during the task, responses 
were faster to self-than to friend-related items (b =  − 38.08, 
SE = 3.41, t =  − 11.17, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.25). In contrast, 
when friend-related stimuli were presented most frequently, 
responses were faster to friend- than to self-related items 
(b = 12.12, SE = 3.23, t = 3.75, p = 0.01, R2 = 0.22). As 
revealed by the respective effect sizes, stimulus prioritization 
was most pronounced when self-related (vs. friend-related) 
items predominated during the task.
To explore the dynamic character of these effects, sepa-
rate Shape Association X Trial Number analysis was under-
taken for each of the Stimulus Frequency conditions. When 
the self-related shape predominated, only a main effect 
of Shape Association (b =  − 29.68, SE = 6.75, t =  − 4.39, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.25) was observed. When the friend-related 
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shape was presented most frequently during the task, a main 
effect of Trial Number (b =  − 0.11, SE = 0.05, t = 1.20, 
p = 0.048, R2 = 0.22) and a significant Shape Association 
X Trial Number interaction (b = 0.13, SE = 0.05, t = 2.33, 
p = 0.02, R2 = 0.22) emerged. Further inspection of the inter-
action indicated that, when friend-related stimuli appeared 
more frequently, whereas response times toward these items 
decreased over the course of the experiment (b =  − 0.24, 
SE = 0.05, t =  − 4.25, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.23), there was no sig-
nificant change in response times toward self-related stimuli.
Accuracy
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy 
of responses revealed a main effect of Shape Association 
(b = 0.34, SE = 0.058, z = 5.87, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.09) and 
significant Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association 
(b =  − 0.18, SE = 0.06, z =  − 3.15, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.12), 
Shape Association X Matching Condition (b = 0.24, 
SE = 0.06, z = 4.16, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.10), Stimulus Fre-
quency X Shape Association X Trial Number (b =  − 0.001. 
SE < 0.001, z =  − 3.18, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.12), Shape Associa-
tion X Matching Condition X Trial Number (b =  − 0.001. 
SE < 0.001, z =  − 2.18, p = 0.03, R2 = 0.10), and Stimulus 
Frequency X Shape Association X Matching Condition 
X Trial Number (b = 0.001, SE < 0.001, z = 2.05, p = 0.04, 
R2 = 0.13) interactions.
To explore further the four-way interaction, separate 
Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association X Trial Num-
ber analyses were undertaken for each Matching Condition 
(Fig. 6). On matching trials, this yielded a main effect of 
Shape Association (b = 0.60, SE = 0.08, z = 7.25, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.15), and significant Shape Association X Trial Num-
ber (b =  − 0.001, SE = 0.007, z =  − 2.52, p = 0.01, R2 = 0.15) 
and Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association (b =  − 0.30, 
SE = 0.08, z =  − 3.58, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.17) interactions. 
When the self-shape was presented most frequently dur-
ing the task, accuracy was higher for self-related compared 
to friend-related stimuli (b = 0.74, SE = 0.06, z = 12.86, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.19). Conversely, when the friend-shape 
comprised the most frequent stimulus, no significant differ-
ence in accuracy was observed. Thus, stimulus prioritization 
only emerged when self-related shapes predominated.
On nonmatching trials, the analysis yielded a signifi-
cant Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association X Trial 
Number (b =  − 0.002, SE < 0.001, z =  − 3.35, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.14) interaction. As such, separate Shape Associa-
tion X Trial Number analyses were undertaken for each of 
the Stimulus Frequency conditions. When the self-shape 
was presented most frequently during the task, the analysis 
revealed a Shape Association X Trial Number (b = 0.003, 
SE = 0.001, z = 3.15, p = 0.001, R2 = 0.20) interaction. 
Whereas accuracy for the friend-shape decreased over time 
Fig. 5  Mean response time as a function of Stimulus Frequency and 
Shape Association (Expt. 3—Dis-confirmatory Context). Error bars 
represent + 1 SEM
Fig. 6  Mean accuracy as a 
function of Stimulus Frequency, 
Shape Association, and Match-
ing Condition (Expt. 3—Dis-
confirmatory Context). Error 
bars represent + 1 SEM
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(b =  − 0.004, SE = 0.001, z =  − 2.30, p = 0.02, R2 = 0.11), 
no significant difference was observed for the self-shape. 
When the friend-shape comprised the most frequent stimu-
lus, the analysis also revealed a Shape Association X Trial 
Number (b =  − 0.002, SE = 0.001, z =  − 2.03, p = 0.04, 
R2 = 0.11) interaction. Whereas accuracy on self-related tri-
als decreased over time (b =  − 0.003, SE = 0.001, z =  − 1.95, 
p = 0.05, R2 = 0.09), no significant difference was observed 
on friend-related trials.
Drift diffusion modeling
As previously, an HDDM analysis was performed on the 
data. Extending Experiment 2, a dynamic-bias approach 
was adopted to model the data. Of theoretical interest was 
exploring the time course of decisional processing in a task 
context in which stimulus-related expectancies pertaining to 
the self and a friend were disconfirmed. Previous research 
on this topic has demonstrated that expectancy violation 
influences the parameters of decision-making, suggesting 
that response and stimulus biases are sensitive both to prior 
information (i.e., expectations provided to participants) and 
trial-by-trial sensory experiences (Falbén et al., 2020). What 
is not yet known, however, is whether these decisional pro-
cesses are sensitive to disconfirmation as it unfolds over the 
course of the task. As such, here we considered the temporal 
dynamics of decisional bias during shape-label matching. To 
do so, Trial Number was regressed as a continuous variable 
for each parameter estimate. Following Experiment 2, for 
model comparison, three model parameterizations were con-
ducted. Model 3 was identified as the best fitting (Table 5).
Analysis of the best fitting model revealed that decision-
making was underpinned by variation in information uptake 
(drift rate, v), decision-making style (boundary separation, 
a), and the evidential requirements of response generation 
(starting point, z, Table 6). In addition, dynamic changes in 
some of these biases were also observed. First, in the friend-
frequent condition (i.e., self-shapes were expected to appear 
more frequently, but did not), there was extremely strong 
evidence that information uptake (i.e., drift rate) was faster 
for self-related compared to friend-related stimuli (nega-
tive drift rates were first multiplied by − 1) during matching 
trials (pBayes[self > friend] < 0.001). In addition, there was 
extremely strong evidence for an increase in the rate of infor-
mation uptake for friend-related stimuli during matching 
trials over the course of the task (pBayes[friend: Trial Num-
ber] < 0.001), and extremely strong evidence for a decrease 
in the rate of information uptake for these items during non-
matching trials (pBayes[friend: Trial Number] = 0.005). In the 
self-frequent condition (i.e., friend-shapes were expected to 
appear more frequently, but did not), there was extremely 
strong evidence that the rate of information uptake was 
faster for self-related than friend-related stimuli on both 
matching (pBayes[self > friend] < 0.001) and nonmatching 
(pBayes[self > friend] = 0.04) trials. In addition, during non-
matching trials, the rate of information uptake for friend-
related stimuli increased over time (pBayes[friend: Trial 
Number] = 0.02).
Table 5  Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Expt. 
3)
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Table 6  Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) 
quantiles of the best fitting model (Expt. 3)
a boundary separation, v drift rate, z starting point, t0 non-decision 
time, sv inter-trial variability in drift rate, st inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time, sz inter-trial variability in starting point
Diffusion model parameter Mean Quantile
2.5q 97.5q
afriend-frequent 1.046 0.898 1.252
aself-frequent 0.96 0.892 1.032
vfriend-frequent/matching-self 1.987 1.317 2.598
vfriend-frequent/matching-friend 0.954 0.477 1.402
vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-self − 1.632 − 2.302 − 0.959
vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-friend − 1.515 − 2.032 − 1.041
vself-frequent/matching-self 2.521 1.929 3.114
vself-frequent/matching-friend 0.672 0.477 0.882
vself-frequent/nonmatching-self − 1.857 − 2.397 − 1.262
vself-frequent/nonmatching-friend − 1.346 − 1.857 − 0.754
z 0.505 0.486 0.425
t0 0.415 0.404 0.42
st 0.44 0.422 0.448
sv 0.102 0.002 0.233
sz 0.787 0.677 0.849
Regression coefficients (trial number)
  afriend-frequent − 4.44E-04 − 0.001 − 4.62E-05
  aself-frequent 2.65E-05 − 4.11E-04 4.98E-04
  vfriend-frequent/matching-self − 0.002 − 0.006 0.001
  vfriend-frequent/matching-friend 0.005 0.002 0.007
  vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-self 0.002 − 0.001 0.003
  vfriend-frequent/nonmatching-friend − 0.003 − 0.005 − 0.001
  vself-frequent/matching-self − 0.001 − 0.002 0.004
  vself-frequent/matching-friend − 0.001 − 0.003 0.001
  vself-frequent/nonmatching-self − 0.001 − 0.003 0.001
  vself-frequent/nonmatching-friend 0.005 0.001 0.009
 z − 5.80E-05 − 2.10E-04 1.21E-04
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Second, there was strong evidence that participants 
adopted a more conservative decisional strategy (i.e., larger 
a) when self-shapes were expected to be more frequent (i.e., 
friend-shapes predominated) than vice versa (pBayes[friend-
frequent > self-frequent] = 0.017). The trial-by-trial analy-
sis revealed that decisional caution reduced over the course 
of the task when self-shapes were expected to be the most 
frequent but friend-shapes predominated (pBayes[friend-
frequent: Trial Number] = 0.01). Finally, comparison of the 
observed starting value (z) with no bias (z = 0.50) indicated 
no evidence of a response bias (pBayes[bias > 0.50] = 0.35).
Discussion
The current findings extend the effects reported in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. On both matching and nonmatching trials, 
whether participants expected self-shapes or friend-shapes 
to comprise the most frequently presented items, responses 
were speeded for the shapes that actually predominated dur-
ing the task. As previously, however, stimulus prioritiza-
tion was greater for self- compared to friend-related stimuli. 
Regarding the accuracy of performance, self-prioritization 
emerged when self-shapes predominated during match-
ing trials. Across the course of the shape-label matching 
task, self- and friend-related expectancies also yielded 
some interesting dynamic differences. Specifically, when 
participants expected the self-shape to be presented most 
frequently, but it was the friend-shape that actually predomi-
nated, response latencies to the friend-shape decreased over 
time and no difference was observed for the self-shape. In 
contrast, when participants expected the friend-shape to be 
presented most frequently, but the self-shape predominated, 
response latencies were faster to the self-shape (vs. friend-
shape) throughout the task. This suggests that, compared to 
the friend-related expectancy, prior beliefs about the self 
were less malleable (Wang et al., 2016).
Corroborating Experiment 2, decisional bias was 
underpinned by a stimulus bias, with information uptake 
faster for self- compared to friend-relevant stimuli. Inter-
estingly, however, dynamic changes in stimulus process-
ing were also observed, but only for friend-related items. 
Notably, when the friend-related stimulus was presented 
most frequently, the rate of information uptake for this 
item increased over time. Similarly, when the self-shape 
predominated, dynamic changes in information uptake 
were observed only for the friend-related stimulus. This 
indicates that, compared to friend-relevant material, the 
processing of self-relevant stimuli is less susceptible 
to modification in a task context in which prior beliefs 
regarding the frequency of stimulus presentation are dis-
confirmed. As in Experiment 2, the HDDM analysis also 
revealed differences in decision-making style, such that 
participants were more cautious (i.e., wider threshold 
separation) when self-related (vs. friend-related) stimuli 
were expected to appear more frequently, an effect that 
diminished over time.
Additional analysis
To explore the effects of stimulus frequency across con-
firmatory and dis-confirmatory task contexts, an additional 
analysis was undertaken by combining the data from Experi-
ments 2 and 3. A multilevel model analysis was used to 
examine the correct RT and accuracy data. Task Context 
(confirmatory or dis-confirmatory), Stimulus Frequency 
(self-frequent or friend-frequent), Shape Association (self or 
friend), and Matching Condition (matching or nonmatching) 
were treated as categorical fixed effects, and participants as 
a crossed random effect.
Response time
The analysis yielded main effects of Shape Association 
(b = -10.75, SE = 1.71, t =  − 6.27, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.19), and 
Matching Condition (b =  − 24.14, SE = 1.72, t =  − 14.06, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.21), and significant Task Context X Stim-
ulus Frequency (b = 6.70, SE = 1.72, t = 3.90, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.19), Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association 
(b =  − 29.90, SE = 1.71, t =  − 17.43, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.21), 
Shape Association X Matching Condition (b =  − 7.92, 
SE = 1.71, t =  − 4.62, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.21), Task Context 
X Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association (b = -5.22, 
SE = 1.71, t =  − 3.04, p = 0.002, R2 = 0.21), and Stimulus 
Frequency X Shape Association X Matching Condition 
(b = 3.53, SE = 1.71, t = 2.06, p = 0.04, R2 = 0.23) interac-
tions. The Task Context X Stimulus Frequency X Shape 
Association X Matching Condition interaction was not 
significant.
To further explore the critical Task Context X Stimulus 
Frequency X Shape Association interaction, separate Task 
Context X Shape Association analyses were conducted for 
each Stimulus Frequency collapsed across Matching Condi-
tion (Fig. 7). When self-related stimuli were presented most 
frequently, the analysis yielded a main effect of Shape Asso-
ciation, such that responses were faster to self- compared 
to friend-related items (b =  − 24.40, SE = 2.03, t =  − 12.04, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.27). When friend-related items comprised 
the most frequently encountered stimuli, the analysis yielded 
a main effect of Shape Association, with responses faster to 
friend- than self-related items (b = 11.81, SE = 2.06, t = 5.73, 




A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy 
of responses revealed a main effect of Shape Association 
(b = 0.26, SE = 0.02, z = 12.68, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.12), and sig-
nificant Stimulus Frequency X Shape Association (b = 0.42, 
SE = 0.02, z = 20.04, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.15), Shape Associa-
tion X Matching Condition (b = 0.13, SE = 0.02, z = 6.51, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.13), and Task Context X Stimulus Fre-
quency X Shape Association (b = 0.08, SE = 0.02, z = 3.81, 
p = 0.001, R2 = 0.16) interactions. The Task Context X Stim-
ulus Frequency X Shape Association X Matching Condition 
interaction was not significant. To explore further the criti-
cal three-way interaction, separate Task Context X Shape 
Association analyses were conducted for each Stimulus Fre-
quency collapsed across Matching Condition (Fig. 8).
When self-related stimuli appeared most frequently, 
the analysis yielded a main effect of Shape Association 
(b = 0.69, SE = 0.03, z = 23.12, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.21) and a 
significant Task Context X Shape Association (b = 0.06, 
SE = 0.03, z = 2.22, p = 0.02, R2 = 0.21) interaction. Par-
ticipants responded more accurately to self- compared to 
friend-related stimuli in both a confirmatory (b = 0.75, 
SE = 0.04, z = 17.22, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.23) and dis-confirm-
atory (b = 0.62, SE = 0.04, z = 15.42, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.18) 
task context, but this effect was most pronounced in the 
former setting. When friend-related stimuli were encoun-
tered most frequently during the task, the analysis again 
revealed a main effect of Shape Association (b =  − 0.15, 
SE = 0.03, z =  − 5.13, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.10) and a sig-
nificant Task Context X Shape Association (b =  − 0.09, 
SE = 0.03, z =  − 3.10, p = 0.002, R2 = 0.11) interaction. 
Whereas participants responded more accurately to 
friend- compared to self-related stimuli in a confirmatory 
task context (b =  − 0.24, SE = 0.04, z =  − 5.67, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.14), this effect was not significant in a dis-confirm-
atory setting.
Fig. 7  Mean response time as 
a function of Task Context, 
Stimulus Frequency, and Shape 
Association (Expts. 2 & 3 com-
bined). Error bars represent + 1 
SEM
Fig. 8  Mean accuracy as a func-
tion of Task Context, Stimulus 
Frequency, and Shape Associa-
tion (Expts. 2 & 3 combined). 




The combined analyses revealed that, during both match-
ing and nonmatching trials, stimulus prioritization was 
driven by the frequency with which items were presented 
in combination with the personal relevance of the material. 
Specifically, across both confirmatory and dis-confirmatory 
task contexts, frequently (vs. infrequently) presented items 
were prioritized during decisional processing when they 
were associated with the self. When friend-related items 
predominated, a comparable effect emerged only in a con-
firmatory task context. Thus, while item frequency triggers 
stimulus prioritization, self-relevance provides an extra 
benefit during decisional processing (Humphreys & Sui, 
2016; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015, 2017).
General discussion
Numerous studies have revealed the benefits of self-rele-
vance on decision-making (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015, 2017). Compared to stimuli associ-
ated with other people, those paired with the self are pri-
oritized during decisional processing. Developing work 
on this topic, here we demonstrated that prioritization was 
influenced by the personal significance of stimuli in com-
bination with the frequency in which they were encoun-
tered. Specifically, when self- and friend-related stimuli 
were equally likely to be encountered during a shape-label 
matching task, a self-prioritization effect emerged (Expt. 
1). In addition, in confirmatory (Expt. 2) and dis-confirm-
atory (Expt. 3) task contexts, frequently (vs. infrequently) 
encountered items were prioritized both for the self and a 
friend (cf. Sui et al., 2014). Crucially, however, stimulus 
prioritization was greater for self- compared to friend-
related items. Underpinning the facilitated responding in 
each of the reported experiments was variation in the rate 
of information uptake during decision-making (Golubickis 
et al., 2017, 2020), with evidence extracted more rapidly 
from self-related compared to friend-related stimuli.
Despite the adoption of a broadly similar task con-
text, the current results failed to corroborate prior work 
exploring the effects of item frequency on the emergence 
of self-prioritization. Using a sequential version of the 
shape-label matching task, Sui et al., (2014) reported that 
self-bias was largely unaffected by the frequency of stim-
ulus presentation, with self-prioritization emerging even 
when self-relevant stimuli were presented only occasion-
ally. Moreover, although a stimulus-prioritization effect 
was observed when mother-related items predominated 
during the task, this benefit was contingent upon stranger 
being the target of comparison. When mother-related items 
comprised the predominant stimuli and self-related items 
appeared less frequently, task performance was compa-
rable. Crucially, however, Sui et al. (2014) provided no 
prior information to participants regarding the frequency 
of stimulus presentation and employed two targets of self-
other comparison (i.e., mother & stranger), an additional 
factor that may have contributed to the reported effects. 
Given the current findings (see also Falbén et al., 2020), 
it appears that item prioritization may be more pliable 
when stimulus-related expectations are furnished before 
the matching task commences.
While an extensive literature has demonstrated self-
prioritization during shape-label matching trials (Frings 
& Wentura, 2014; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Schäfer 
et al., 2015, 2016; Sui et al., 2012), comparable effects on 
nonmatching trials have been less frequent with stimulus 
enhancement sometimes even going in the wrong direction 
(Payne et al., 2017; Stolte et al., 2017). Accordingly, in the 
current investigation, no hypotheses were made regard-
ing nonmatching trials. Interestingly, however, significant 
effects were observed. As revealed by the combined analy-
sis, stimulus prioritization emerged on both matching and 
nonmatching trials for frequently (vs. infrequently) encoun-
tered items. What this suggests is that prior beliefs sensitized 
participants to the actual presentation of self- and friend-
related items during the task, ultimately triggering stimulus 
prioritization regardless of whether matching or nonmatch-
ing responses were required. In other words, the relative 
contribution of top–down (i.e., prior beliefs) and bottom–up 
attentional operations during decisional processing varied 
as a function of the task context, such that properties of the 
stimuli (e.g., frequency of presentation, personal relevance) 
dominated processing when the to-be-judged items were 
made salient (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015, 2017). Although it is commonplace for researchers 
to exclude nonmatching trials from statistical analysis (Hu 
et al., 2020; Schäfer et al., in press; Sel et al., 2019), the 
current results caution against this approach. As a function 
of the prevailing task context, there would appear to be con-
ditions under which self-prioritization emerges regardless 
of trial type (Janczyk et al., 2019; Moradi et al., 2015; Sui 
et al., 2014). Future research should therefore clarify exactly 
when and how self-relevance influences performance during 
nonmatching shape-label trials.
Triggering self‑prioritization
In a world of daunting complexity, mechanisms are needed 
to direct attention to task-relevant stimuli (e.g., a red light at 
the intersection) while downplaying the appeal of distracting 
objects (e.g., a colleague on the sidewalk). To realize these 
objectives, models of selective attention posit the interplay 
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between two processes, voluntary (i.e., goal-directed) and 
automatic (i.e., stimulus-driven) attentional control (e.g., 
Corbetta & Shulman, 2001; Itti & Koch, 2001; Theeuwes, 
2010), such that information processing is driven by a com-
bination of current goals and priorities and the physical 
properties of the stimulus environment (e.g., salience of 
objects). Within this general framework, Humphreys and 
Sui (2015) have argued that, much like the effects of per-
ceptual salience, self-prioritization reflects the operation of 
an automatic attentional process that alters the potency of 
personally meaningful material (Sui & Humphreys, 2016, 
2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). According to this account, 
self-prioritization is a pivotal, stimulus-driven property of 
mental life. As Sui and Rotshtein (2019, p. 151) have put it, 
“…self-relevance acts like a gold thread to facilitate process-
ing of information.”
Although certain exemplars of self-relevant stimuli—
including one’s face or forename—may be prioritized 
automatically (e.g., Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bargh, 1982; 
Keyes & Brady, 2010; Moray, 1959; but see Alzueta et al., 
2019), effects of this kind probably originate in the famili-
arity of the items. Indeed, when arbitrary objects comprise 
the stimuli of interest, evidence to support the mandatory 
prioritization of self-relevant material is conspicuously 
lacking (Caughey et al., 2021). Instead, stimulus prioritiza-
tion necessitates the operation of goal-directed processing 
(Posner & Petersen, 1990). For example, using breaking 
continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) to explore the ease 
with which Gabor patches enter consciousness, Stein et al. 
(2016) found no advantage for self-relevant stimuli (cf. 
Macrae et al., 2017). Interesting, however, in a prior Gabor-
label perceptual-matching task, a standard self-prioritization 
effect was observed. In much the same way, Siebold et al. 
(2015) reported no evidence that self-relevance enhanced 
stimulus (i.e., lines) detection in a rapid visual search para-
digm, although a self-prioritization effect was observed in 
an earlier line-label matching task. Outside the realm of 
explicit shape-label matching tasks, findings such as these 
challenge the contention that self-prioritization is an obliga-
tory stimulus-driven phenomenon. Absent task instructions 
that direct attention to the self-relevance (or otherwise) of 
stimuli, prioritization reliably fails to arise (Caughey et al., 
2021; Constable et al., 2019a, 2019b; Falbén et al., 2019).
Falling short of compulsory, the benefits of self-relevance 
are nevertheless considerable (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015, 2017). Here, we showed that stimulus 
prioritization was impacted by the frequency with which 
items were encountered in tandem with the personal rel-
evance of the to-be-judged items. Crucially, although stim-
ulus prioritization was observed for frequently presented 
items whether they pertained to the self or a friend, this 
effect was augmented by the relevance of the material, such 
that processing gains were larger for stimuli that related 
to the self (i.e., Expts. 2 & 3). In other words, consistent 
with the SAN model (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Hum-
phreys, 2015, 2017), the benefits of self-relevance supple-
mented the effects of stimulus frequency. Contrasting Fal-
bén et al. (2020), the absence of powerful response-related 
expectancies in shape-label matching tasks likely triggered 
these differences in stimulus prioritization. Indeed, reflect-
ing the benefit that personal relevance exerts during deci-
sional processing, a self-prioritization effect emerged even 
when prior instructions indicated that equivalent numbers of 
self- and friend-related stimuli would be encountered dur-
ing the task (i.e., Expt. 1). This indicates that probabilistic 
manipulations were accompanied by a default bias toward 
self-relevant material during decision-making (Humphreys 
& Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys 2015, 2017 ).
Further exploring the character of stimulus prioritiza-
tion, a dynamic analysis yielded evidence for the stability 
of self-bias. The results of Experiment 3 revealed that prior 
stimulus-based expectations were impacted by the actual 
frequency of stimulus presentation, irrespective of the tar-
get with which the items had been associated (cf. Sui et al., 
2014). Nevertheless, associations formed in relation to the 
self (vs. friend) induced a more persistent bias, such that 
beliefs about the self were less susceptible to updating on the 
basis of trial-by-trial information. That is, stimulus-related 
beliefs about the self (vs. friend) were resistant to modi-
fication in the face of disconfirmation. Relatedly, using a 
relearning paradigm, Wang et al. (2016) demonstrated par-
ticipants’ difficulties overcoming prior self-shape (vs. friend-
shape) associations when forming new target-shape rela-
tions. Although speculative, this property of self-bias would 
clearly facilitate the maintenance of stable beliefs about the 
self, an essential component of social–cognitive functioning 
(Greenwald, 1980; Markus, 1977). An intriguing possibility 
is that, compared to beliefs pertaining to other persons, prior 
expectations about the self are weighted more heavily, thus 
less sensitive to dis-confirmatory sensory inputs. A useful 
direction for future research will therefore be to explicate 
how a range of factors—including goals, needs, and prefer-
ences—influence the processes (top–down & bottom–up) 
that underpin the emergence and stability of self-prioritiza-
tion across a range of task contexts.
Pathways to stimulus prioritization
Dominant accounts of self-prioritization assert that stimu-
lus relevance moderates the efficiency of visual process-
ing (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 
2017). Specifically, through increased social salience, self-
relevance (vs. other relevance) facilitates the perceptual 
appraisal of stimuli. Evidence supporting this viewpoint is 
limited, however, and derived primarily from work exploring 
the neural correlates of self-prioritization (Sui et al., 2013, 
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2015a, 2015b; but see Schäfer & Frings, 2019). In behavio-
ral research investigating the cognitive origins of self-bias, 
a quite different picture has emerged, prompting researchers 
to suggest that stimulus prioritization may originate instead 
in different underlying mechanisms: including capacity 
limitations in working memory and response-related pro-
cesses (e.g., Constable et al., 2019a, 2019b; Falbén et al., 
2020; Golubickis et al., 2018; Janczyk et al., 2019; Reuther 
& Chakravarthi, 2017). What these diverse viewpoints sug-
gest is that, far from representing a unitary phenomenon, 
stimulus prioritization can be underpinned by a variety of 
operations. That is, depending upon the task, stimuli, and 
processing objectives in place, there are multiple routes to 
the prioritization of material associated with the self.
Consider, for example, classic matching tasks in which 
geometric shapes are associated with labels pertaining to 
various persons (Sui et al., 2012). When no other poten-
tially task-relevant information is provided, the most sali-
ent feature of the immediate context is the experimentally 
induced shape-label associations (e.g., self = triangle, 
friend = square). Unsurprisingly, therefore, participants 
adopt a task-related strategy that focuses on the self-rele-
vance of the stimuli (I am a triangle), a tactic that is undoubt-
edly bolstered by the enhanced strength of self-shape (vs. 
friend-shape) associations in working memory (Reuther & 
Chakravarthi, 2017). Interestingly, as revealed in the current 
inquiry, a default preference for self-relevant material also 
arises when participants are informed that self- and friend-
related items are equally likely to be encountered during the 
task (i.e., Expt. 1). Critically, however, when expectancies 
about the occurrence of self-related and friend-related items 
differ, self-relevance is replaced by stimulus prevalence as 
the most pertinent aspect of the task context. Correspond-
ingly, frequently (vs. infrequently) encountered stimuli are 
prioritized during shape-label matching. Nevertheless, pro-
cessing gains are most pronounced for material associated 
with the self, reflecting the powerful influence that self-rel-
evance exerts during decisional processing (Humphreys & 
Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017).
The plasticity of stimulus prioritization also extends 
to its underlying origins. Rather than stimulus prioritiza-
tion comprising an exclusively perceptual phenomenon 
(Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017), 
stimulus enhancement is underpinned by operations that are 
highly sensitive to the prevailing task context. Considering 
only research that has adopted a DDM analysis to elucidate 
sources of decisional bias (i.e., stimulus and/or response 
biases), a complex picture emerges. While, as in the current 
investigation, prioritization can be driven by differences in 
the rate of information uptake (i.e., a stimulus bias; Golu-
bickis et al., 2017, 2020), in other settings, bias originates 
in the evidential requirements of response selection (a 
response bias; Falbén et al., 2020; Golubickis et al., 2018, 
2019). Much like the emergence of stimulus prioritization, 
of importance are the characteristics of the task context in 
which bias is assessed. When tasks favor the adoption of 
egocentric decisional strategies or specific responses are 
more probable or rewarding than others, stimulus prioritiza-
tion is underpinned by differences in the evidential require-
ments of response selection (Falbén et al., 2020; Golubickis 
et al., 2018, 2019). In contrast, when differences in the 
strength of associations in working memory influence the 
ease with which the veracity of shape-label pairings can be 
established (Ratcliff et al., 2016; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 
2017), decisional bias resides in the rate at which infor-
mation is extracted from stimuli (Golubickis et al., 2017, 
2020; Hu et al., 2020; Janczyk et al., 2019). Thus, rather than 
reflecting the operation of a single underlying process, there 
are several pathways to stimulus prioritization. As a function 
of task context and prevailing goal states, optimal decision-
making reflects shifts in the priority given to stimulus and 
response-related operations (Bogacz et al., 2006; Leite & 
Ratcliff, 2011; White & Poldrack, 2014).
Conclusion
In a shape-label matching task, here we showed that stimu-
lus prioritization was sensitive to the frequency of stimulus 
presentation in combination with the personal relevance of 
the to-be-judged items (cf. Sui et al., 2014). When self- and 
friend-related items were equally likely to be encountered, a 
self-prioritization effect was observed. Additionally, in both 
confirmatory and dis-confirmatory task contexts, stimuli that 
were encountered frequently (vs. infrequently) were prior-
itized, an effect that was most pronounced for self-relevant 
(vs. friend-relevant) items. Underpinning these prioritiza-
tion effects was variation in the rate of information uptake, 
such that decisional evidence was extracted more rapidly 
from self-related than friend-related stimuli. These findings 
further inform understanding of the emergence and origin 
of self-prioritization effects during decisional processing.
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